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Stewart and Zimmerman: To Dehumanize and Slaughter: A Natural History Model of Massacres
TO DEHUHAHIZE AND SLAUGHTER:
A NATURAL HISTORY MODEL OF MASSACRES

Jsses R. Stewart

Ihiiversity of South Dakota
Lariy J. Zisaienian
University of South Dakota

INTRODUCTION

The phenon^on of massacre appears as a bll^t on the history of mankinds

and

history is replete with numerous examples. Despite their apparent ba^aric
nature, however, massacres have probably been more coaooon in the contemporary
world. A concept of massacres is often evsduative, based principally (Hi public
perception. Newspaper headlines detailing the gore of Hy Lai and Sabra-Shatilla
captivated and titillated readers throughout the world.
Reported, but not
documented, examples of "mass murder" in Cambodia, Uganda end Afghanistan also
attested to its prevalence.
What combination of factors - sociological, psyohological, political, or economic - produce this extreme form of group behavior?
What are the underlying causes of massacres? Do they follow a common pattern or
is each unique?
Providing answers to these questions will be the purpose of
this paper.
MASSACRE DEFINED

Massacre

can be defined as the indiscriminate killing of a sizeable number of

members of one group by members of another more powerful group in a face-to-face
situation within a relatively brief period of time.
This definiticHi restricts
the general usage of the tern and excludes such episodes as the "St. Valen
tine's Day Massacre," military defeats that are loosely labeled as massacres,
and large-scale genocidal practices.
The most salient feature of a massacre is the indiscriminate killing of the
victims.
Massacres represent, in effect,
an outburst of immoderate killings
that exceed social prescriptions. The Battle of Little Big Horn (Custw's Last'

Stand), for instance, wouldn't fit the definition be(»use it was simply a mili
tary confrontation between belligerents who were more or less foll(Jwing
the
prevailing rules of warfare.
Although certain'elements conform to our defini
tion, the episode lacks the essentisd ingredient of smseless, indiscriminate
killing.

Similarly, mass gangland slayings do not conform to the definition. They are
more accurately depicted as a ritualized mass murder of. one oriminal element by
another.
Given the sometimes homicidal nature of the organized orise counter
culture, these episodes probably (xmfom to nefarious norms.

Deliberate, broad-scale policies that

are desired to annihilate meadsers of a

religious, racial, or ethnic group have also been excluded from consideration.
Although heinous, and usually resulting in the deaths of thousands or millions
of people, genocide programs are the result of contemplative policies by govern
ments and are long-term in duration.
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Massacres, by contrast, afpear to be somewhat spontaneous and typically
feature a loss of control on the part of i&embers of the massacring group.
Massacres t«td to happen rather quickly and result from unanticipated, highly
emotional behavior, in contrast to the methodical extermination practices of a
society committing genocide against a minority group.
Although not discussing
the topic of massacre specifically, Lofland (1981) has identified similar pat
terns in his analysis of collective hostilities.
Massacres would focus on the
highest level of collective violence — that directed against other human beings
(1881: 427-428).
Massacres possess seven distinguishing charcu^teristics that tend to differen
tiate them from related events. First, massacres exhibit indiscriminate killing
with casualties being inflicted on a cross-section of a population.
Included
among the victims are persons who are generally considered non-conbatants, such
as women, children, and the elderly.
G^erally protected by "rules of war,"
these relatively defenseless people are preyed upon by the massacring group.
Secondly, the perpetrators, within the massacre setting, have marked super
iority over the victim group, either because of- sheer numbers or tecteolcgical
superiority.
When two groups are more or less evenly matched in terms of
strength, a stalemate or stand-off is the likely result of confrontaticnj there
fore, massacres are possible only when one group possesses a considerable advan
tage.

The third characteristic centers on excessive' killing.
All cultures have
norms
that prescribe rules about killing that ^ecify acceptable victims and
desi^ate the circumstances under which killing is justified.
Massacres exceed
the normative boundaries and represent collective deviant behavior.
The power
ful group at some point in the confrontation "loses control" and proceeds to
annihilate the victims.

A fourth feature of massacre centers on the victim group's incapability of
offering resistance, either because of the massive superiority of the attackers
or the defenseless nature of the non-cosbatants.
That the defenseless group is
thm slaughtered illustrates unnecessary, excessive killing.
The fifth characteristic of a massacre is that i t features face-to-face inter
action. Massacres always involve combatants who are in close physical proximity.
The dropping of a bomb which subsequently results in the destruction of an
entire city would therefore not be considered a massacre even though it kills
defenseless non-combatants. It does not involve the personal confrontaticn that
takes place in a massacre.
Massacres involve victims who can be seen and
touched.

The sixth trait of massacre resides in its short duration. Massacre typically
take place in one outburst.
Most massacres, in fact, take only a few minutes
and rarely exceed an hour in length.
-This is in contrast to long-term episodes
of hostility (i.e. a sustained program of genocide) which may be characterized
by repeated confrontations.
Finally, massacres always involve a sizable number of deaths.
It is hard to
draw a firm line between episodes of massacre and mass murder, but the former
typically has scores of victims while the latter rarely exceeds a dozen. This
distinction is not crucial to the definition, but the nunber of victims is
always substantial in outbursts of massacre.
The preceding characteristics represent the essential ingredients of an epi
sode of massacre.
The operationalization of the definition was difficult be
cause of the many types of similar phenomena in the history of human conflict.
As. with many investigations, it was necessary to delimit the scope of the
research topic and to confine our observations to the episodes which conformed
to seven characteristics.
Although some characteristics do-occur in related
kinds of killing situati<xis, in massacre all seven coalesce.
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METHODOLOGY

The underlying assuii5»tion of this research rests with the validity and useful
ness of the "natural history" approach. This approach is baswi on several pre
sumptions:

1) that reality contains certain regularities from which consistent

patterns can be inferred (Abrahamson, 1978:98-99); 2) that a planned selection,
abstraction and accentuation of a set of criteria derived from empirical ref
erents and functions can be used as a basis of comparison of empirical cases
(HcKinney, 1866:3); and that recurrent tend«jcies that are present in the
phenomenon under scrutiny can be identified. Data gathering for this Investiga
tion was based upon a method developed for the study of social protest by
Hillian Gamson (1975) in which he obtained a complete listing of all social
protests

that occurred in the United States between 1800 and 1845.

He then

randomly selected a sample of the protests for Intensive study. He then, in
effect, "interviewed" each to ascertain characteristics about the causes, char
acteristics and cons^uences of the protest groups. He began by examining the

subject indexes of history and anthropology books for the key word "massacre".
The results,.unfortunately, were very limited because even though a sizable list
of massacres was obtained,

many did not confom to our operaticnalized defini

tion, and others did not have readily obtainable documentation.

The availability of adequate documentatdn was critical. Many examples of
massacre seemed to fall within the guidelines of the definition, but had only
limited narratives.
Either there wasn't sufficient detail in the narratives or
some documentation appeared to be too biased to allow for objective analysis.
These

problems were particularly prevelant in the selection of

from

preliterate societies, but their inclusion was. necessary to enhance the general
izing power of the model and to establish its validity and application in both a
cross-cultural and historical context. Limited by these restrictions, the
authors did select the following massacres for analysis:
1. Hv Lai. Vifttnam

On March 16,

1988,

infantrymen of the Anerical Division as-

• sjuilted a small hamlet called My Lai 4.
Although expecting
sizable resistance from a large group of Viet Ceng, the Ameri
Despite this,- the
can soldiers encountered no tostile fire.
troops opened fire on the village's inhabitants: infants,
children, women, and old men.

As a result over 500 noncomba-

tants were executed.
2. Wounded Knee: Sn>ith Dakota

Early in the morning of December 29, 1890, soldiers of
Seventh U.S. Cavalry approached a band of Sioux under
leadership of Big Foot.
The Indians had been ordered to

the
the
the

The soldiers were ordered to peacefully disara the band;

but

site along Wounded Knee Creek on the Pine Ri^e Reservation.

during the ensuing search for weapons a scuffle broke cut and
the soldiers fired on the virtually defenseless Sioux.
The
deaths of over 200 persons, mostly children, womm, and un
armed men resulted.
3. Sand Crftsk. ColnrnHn

Beginning at first light on Noven±)er 29,

1864,

citizen-sol

diers of the Third Colorado Volunteers under the leadership of
Colonel John Chivington attacked a defenseless village of
Cheyenne Indians.
Although the Cheyenne had been praised
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protection by government authorities, the troopers ^>ened fireon the Indians without provocation.
Accounts of the loss-of
life vary, but reliable estimates indicate that over 300
persons were killed and subsequently mutilated.
4. Elotfeta River. New annea

On June 4, 1966, warriors of the Getelu Alliance of the Grand
Valley Dugun Dani launched an attack on Dani neighbors.
The
attack lasted about an hour with nearly 125 m^, women and

children

killed. - The compounds were burned and the village

looted.

5. Beirut. Lebanim.

Members of the right-wing Christian Phalangists entered the
largely defenseless Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and
Shatilla in the early evening hours of September 16, 1982.
During their thirty-six hour stay it was estimated that they

slaughtered from 70p-8(X) inhabit^ts of the two camps.

The

victims were primarily older men, wcmten, and children.
THE HATUBAL HI^TOBY OF HASSiU^HE

The

following five stage, model is the result of extensive analysis of narra

tives that chronicled the selected episodes of massacre. All five massacres were

broken down into detailed chronological listings of significant events that
occurred in each of them. These listings were then compared and cross referenced
with one another.
Although no model perfectly depicts reality, the natural
history model of massacre is composed of
common denominators that ctefaoterised selected massacres.
1. A History of Hiitiinl Hoatilitv

Massacres don't just happen; instead, they are the culmination of a relatively
long period of hostility between two groups. The hostility may be the result of
competition ever scarce resources, such as land, or may stem from various power
struggles.
As usual, the exposing groups likely represent dissimilar cultures
whose values and institutions differ markedly from one another.
Cultural dif
ferences inevitably breed ethnocentrism which manifests itself as religious,
racial, or ethnic prejudice.
An ideology of prejudice usually develops over a
considerable period of time and is nurtured and sustained by periodic confron
tations and conflicts between the groups.
The hostility of.whites toward Native Americans in this country, for example,
evolved from over 300 years of mutual suspicion, distrust, and almost constant
antagonism. The three centuries of conflict have featured policies of genocide,
armed warfare, broken treaties, population transfer, and cultural destruction.
As the history of conflict between groups turned increasingly bitter, reconci
liation became a virtual impossibility.
Both groups came to define the exis
tence of the other as a constant threat to survival.
Alttough the intensity of
the conflict ebbed and flowed during various periods, there existed an unrelent
ing hostility.
Conflicts about land claims and severe cultural differences in
religion and technology constantly exacerbated tensions.
Frontier white set

tlers

summarized this feeling in the frequently voiced statement,

"...the only

good Injun is a dead Injun."

https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/greatplainssociologist/vol2/iss1/2
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American soldiers in Vietnam harbored similar feelings. A favorite joke ammg
American troops was the following plan to win the war (Hersh 1870:11):
The loyal Vietnamese should all be taken and put to sea in a
raft.
Everybody left in the country should then be killed,
• and the nation paved over with concrete, like a parking lot.
Then the raft should be sunk.

The anti-Vietnamese sentiments expressed by U.S. soldiers during the Vietnam
conflict, while relatively short-term in origin, were, in fact, simply a more
recent

version

of a general anti-Asian prejudice

that characterized

American

culture since the latter half of the 19th century.
The pervasivCTiess of the
"gook syndrome" among American forces in Vietnam tapped essentially the same

"yellow peril" mentality . that stigmatized the Japanese during World War II and
the Chinese and Koreans during the Korean Conflict.

In the Grand Valley in the Central Highlands of Hew Guinea,

the Dani, a small

scale society of gardeners and pig raisers, have been Involved in a millennialong cycle of warfare that has been likened to minor skirmishes.
These con

flicts involve neighboring villages and have been linked to competition for
arable land (Heider, 1970).
The skirmishes begin as brawls, but frequently
escalate into feuds between villages.
As people take sides, alliances are
formed.
The skirmishes happen as one alliance challenges the other.
Battle
lines in a no-man's land form and exchanges of arrows and spears occur until a
serious, probably fatal injury, occurs to a combatant. The fighting temporarily
ceases, but if a death occurs, vengeance will be sought.
If vengemce is not
forthcoming, small raids continue in an attempt to exact a compensatory death
from the opponent.
On occasion, the deaths are very oner-sided and tensions
between groups mount to a higher level.
The Getelu Alliance, named for their
leader, had had several setbacks which had cost them prestige, including a
failed pig feast and several unavenged deaths.
Dutch and Indonesian government
officials and missionaries settled near the enemies and tri^ to police the
warfare

cycle but experienced only limited success.

The outsiders

were

also

perceived to side- consistently with the Alliance's enemy in the resolutiOT
process of inter-alliance conflicts.
The result was that meniiers of the Getelu
Alliance viewed their neighbors near the Elogeta River with increasing anger and
a haunting suspicion that their enemies were becoming like foreigners and as
such, they were to be feared and mistrusted (Heider 1970:121).
Similarly the Christian Phalangists' hostility toward Palestinians, while
relatively recent in origin, was especially virulent.
The Lebanese Civil War

broke out in 1975 and pitted Christian gainst Palestinian plus Lebanese Islamic

forces. The Christians viewed the Palestinians as undesirable usurpers of power
in Lebanon and wanted their country rid of them. Increasing pressure from' the
Israeli Defense Forces had pushed the Palestinians into Lebanon where they
immediately challenged the indigenous Phalangist forces for control of the
country. Fighting was particularly intense during the seven year power struggle
with a loss of life estimated to have been over 100,000 persons.
Internecine
stru^les of this type are often surprisingly brutal and both the Phalangists
and Palestinians practiced indiscriminate warfare with civilian deaths easily
outnumbering those among the armed forces.
A "revenge mwitality" typified the
Phalangist forces (Kahan Commission; 1983:12)-which tended to view all Pales
tinians, including women and children, as legitimate targets.
The goal of
Phalangist forces became to rid Lebanon completely of the unwanted Palestinians
using any method possible.
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socialization,

members of opposing groups internalize bitter stereo

types and soon come to perceive mendsers of the other group as something akin to
sub-humans.
This dehumanization process eventually can serve to justify any
inhuman treatment of the other. Host cultures contain values that revere human
life and prescribe tolerance in relations with one another.
These are ideals.

The realities of most cultures contain an inoipi«it ethnooentrisn that, on one
hand, is necessary to group survival but on the other, is a precursor to racism.
In an effort to reduce the cognitive dissonance between the ideal and real cul
tures, the members of the antagonistic group are classified as subhuman.
This
clarification allays any collective guilt that may appear and functions as a

rationalizatiOT for malevolent treatment of an enemy.
The savage
treatment
beccmes sanctioned because meo^rs of the other group are not accorded the
status of being human, but are slurred by such terms as "slopes" or "redskins."

This stage of massacre is characterized by an extreme buildup of emotion. The
"call to rally" functions to rekindle hostility and presents a vivid picture of
threat.

Usually some inflammatory incident or

series of incidents will trans

form latent hostility into manifest rage.
The incidents dramatically reignite
suspicions and mistrust.
The actual precipitating event may be relatively
insignificant, but its importance is amplified in the call to rally because it
serves as a symbolic-representation of the pre-existing hostility.

The act that

eventually triggers the massacre usually appears unexpectedly after a period of
relative calm during which "peaceful" relatiwis prevailed. It enflames old
hatreds and destroys any hope of a peaceful resolution of the conflict by
closing off negotiations.

The accounts of the actual precipitating incident that follow become more
inflammatory as they are retold among the revenge-prone group.
The heinous
nature of the offending group is magnified, and the treacherous nature of the
precipitating ^isode is similarly amplified through these exaggerated accounts
that
axe quickly assimilated according to the predilections of the listeners.

The untrustworthiness of the offending group is emphasized along with the neces
sity and urgency of reprisal.

The My Lai massacre offers an almost classic example of these behaviors. In a
soldiers of the Americal Divi
sion had been victimized by booby traps and mines that inflicted many casual
ties. Rightly or wrongly, the responsibility for these losses was attributed to
the Viet Cong and their sympathizers in the immediate area. Charlie Company, the
unit that would be the most active at My Lai, had experienced an unusually high
number of casualties during the two-week period immediately preceding Hy Lai.
The death of a very popular sergeant a few days before the assault on My Lai
seemed to reuse the surviving members of the company to an almost frenzied level
of hatred.
It was commonly believed that virtually all civilians in the area
were Viet Cong sympathizers who would smile benignly at the Americans during the
day and attempt to harass and kill them at night. During a memorial service for
their sergeant the company captain spoke to the officers and stressed to them
that there weren't going to be any innocent civilians in the village to be
stormed the next morning.
He further concluded that persons remaining in the
village were undoiibtedly the same ones responsible for the recent killing and
maiming of U.S. soldiers (Hammer 1971:188). A revenge mentality was encouraged
and created a rage reaction just waiting to be released.
The attack on Hy Lai,
scheduled for the next day, provided the direction.
three-week period prior to the My Lai massacre,

https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/greatplainssociologist/vol2/iss1/2
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In a similar fashion, the atmosphere between whites and Indians had also
worsened imnediately prior to Wounded Knee because of increased anti-white
activity on the part of the Indians. The increased popularity of the Ghost Dance
cult, which envisioned a complete destruction of whites and a return of ances
tors, was perceived with increasing alarm by both local white settlers in Neb

raska and South Dakota and the U.S. military. As the movement spread across the
western states to the Sioux, uneasy settlers called for increased military
protection.
The Army was also especially anxious to put an end to the "Indian
troubles" that had plagued then on the Plains for several decades.
Reports of Indians making sojourns off the reservaticns and numerous stories
of cattle rustling, horse stealing, and raids wi ranches produced further t^-

sion.

Host were exaggerations, but they nonetheless instilled fear among white

settlers.
Protection was dememded and given by the Amy whose mission was to
return several Sioux bands, to the reservaticxi and disarm them. Newspaper cover
age, often grossly exaggerated, exacerbated the alrecdy touchy situation.
A similar pattern developed with the Cheyenne near Sand Creek in Colorado
where roving bands of warriors raided ranches and settlements at a time when
whites believed inviolable treaties to be in effect.
The-treaties, which were
for the most part unfair to the Indians, left the younger, more militant tribal

members very discontented.

Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of

Cheyenne were peaceful, a perception developed among whites that all Indians
were savage beasts who would nurder and pillage at the slightest provocation.

To combat this hysteria, the local lexers in Colorado formed their own military
unit under Colonel John Chivington. He promised to end the "Indian troubles" by
military action that included the massacre of children because- "nits grow
into lice."

The call to rally for the Dani occurred as the result of the activities of the
police.
Shortly before the massacre, the police had moved in close to one of

the villages.

When the usual "ritoal" cycle of warfare ocoirred,

the police

tended to intervene on the side of the eventual massacre victims;
Getelu Al
liance members grew uneasy.
Both sides had scrupulously avoided asking the
Dutch or Indonesian police for use of shotguns, which would be very effective
for them in their fighting.
They perhaps realized that acquisition of such
powerful weapons by one group would have shifted the balance of power dramati
cally. The members of the Getelu Alliance perceived that, because the enemy was
so "close" to the police, the police would naturally give them shotguns before
the Getelu received them.
The policy had previously given the enemy steel bush
knives shortly before Getelu's followers got them. Even a short lag between the
time the enemy and the Alliance got shotguns would have been perceived as ex
traordinarily dangerous for Alliance survival.

In Lebanon, the call to rally can be traced to the assassination of president
elect Bashir Jemayel on September 14, 1982.
Although no concrete proof of
Palestinian culpability was ever forthcoming, the Christian Phalangists were
convinced of PW guilt.
It served as a cause celebre' and intensified the Pha
langists' predispositions toward vengeance (Kahan, 1803:27). At about the same

time, the Israeli Defense Force made what was later to prove a regrettable
decision.
They had bewi coming under increasing criticism at home not only for
their prolonged stay in Lebanon but also for not allowing the Christian militias
an opportunity to do their own fighting.
As a result, the PhalangistsAebanesa
Army was given the responsibility for searching and mopping up the four Pales
tinian refugee camps in West Beirut (Kahan, 1983:13-14).
Although the IDF
commanders warned the Christian militia not to harm any civilians, the militia
subsequently i^ored the order and launched a surprise sweep of the camps.
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III.

SURPRISE ATTAHt

Surprise

,

is a necessary element in the development of a massacre.

The unex

pected nature of the attack catches the victims completely by surprise and
establishes an initial superiority that is never overcome by the victims. That
the attack is totally unanticipated is indicated by the absence of a defensive
posture. Typically no guards are posted and no weapons are readily at hand.
Frequently, the group of victims includes few, if any, capable defenders. This
may not always be the result of chance, iMit at times nay well be a key factor in
the timing of the attack.

In Hy Lai, the young and middle-aged males were not present.
It is doubtful
that American soldiers knew this, though other previous exercises had notri
similar absences. The superiority in technology, weaponry, and sheer nuBisers
that the Americans enjoyed were simply compourcied by tte absences of armed male

villagers. The village was caught completely unaware because an attack by

American military forces was unimaginable.
early in

The actual attack at My Lai l^an

the morning when helic^ters landed and troops Immediately began

firing.
The landing zone was designated as "hot" with the enemy entrenched
around the village firing at the tro<^ as they landed. Because of this belief,
the Americans were told that My Lai 4 could be considered a "free fire zone"
which all persons in the vicinity should be considered enemies.

in

The Sand Creek massacre developed in a similar manner.
Based upon recent
raids and minor skirmishes, the civilian soldiers believed they were attacking a
hot-bed of Indian militancy.
The "rally cry" asked them to remember their
previously murdered wives and children. The Colorado Volunteers attacked with
out weuming at dawn. The fact that the village warriors were on a hunt and that
village residents were almost completely noncombatants foretold the result;
Incapable of mounting a defense, the Indians were completely overwhelmed.
The Hounded Knee massacre exhibited a somewhat different pattern.
Big Foot's
band of Sioux were to be disarmed and confined to the reservation.
The next

morning they found themselves surrounded by troopers of the 7th Cavalry
(Custer's defeated unit at Little Bighorn) despite the fact that white flag had
been raised over the camp.
The soldiers were under orders to search for and
confiscate any remaining weapons.
After a pile of nearly 40 rifles had been

turned in by the Sioux, trouble began when young warriors, resenting the
harassment, resisted. A medicine man moved through the group exhorting then not
to

cooperate.

A scuffle ensured and a shot was fired.

The actual source

was

unkn^, but it was attributed to a young Indian. This single shot triggered a
massive response. The soldiers, whose guns had been trained on the central band
of warriors, fired into the group, killing or wounding most of them within a
few seconds.
Hotchkiss guns trained on the camp opened up a few seconds later
indiscriminately killing women and children.
In the case of the Dani, the massacre occurred on the morning of June 4, 196S.
Although details are somewhat unclear, the raid was carefully planned by either
Getelu or a group of his younger leaders. The warriors crept through ground fog
at dawn. Other alliances nearby heard about the raid and joined in. The attack
caught the men at the target village completely by surprise.
Their perceived
allies, the Dutch and Indonesian police had gone from the area for a short time.
Though the victims were able to mount an harassing counterattack, they even
tually had to fall back to banks of the Elogeta River where they were slaught
ered.

The Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp were suspected of containing munition
duops for Palestinian guerrillas and hsirboring hard-core terrorists who had
escaped the Israeli dragnet. In fact, the camps were largely defenseless. Most
able-bodied men h^ been forcefully evacuated as part of a settlement with

https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/greatplainssociologist/vol2/iss1/2
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Israel.
In addition, the milti-naticnal peace-keeping forces,
including U.S.
Harines, had been withdrawn shortly after the earlier evacuation.
E}<pecting
opposition and eager to avenge the death of their leader, the Phsdangists
entered the cajDps about 6:00 PH on Thursday, September 16, 1982.
Initially
their entrance was quiet.
Within a short period of tine, however,
sporadic
shooting could be heard by the Israeli units who patrolled the outskirts of the
cani)s. Darkness quickly enveloped the camps and the Israelis, for all practical
purposes, lost contact with the Phalangist militia until they emerged early
Saturday morning after what was later proved to be a night of promiscuous
killing.
IV.

INDISCRIHIHATE SLAUGHTER

The most significant feature of massacres is found at this stage.
Massacres
are characterized by excessive killing.
The murders that occur in a massacre
transcend the cultural norms that define acceptable forms of homicide.
Because of a combination of long-term stirass and the frenzied, emotional
build-up resulting from the recent friction, a reservoir of hate is released
that becomes virtually uncontrollable. Heinous acts serve as emergent norms for
persons in the attacking group.
Behavior that borders on the psyohopathological becomes commonplace.
Members of the attacking group lose control and imi
tate one another's acts, which in normal times would be labeled as unspeakably
cruel.
The massacre may assume the form of a cathartic release of the intense
emotional stress.
Individuals seem to lose critical facilities and experience
the process of deindividualization; the net result is the adoption of behaviors
of nejurly indescribable atrocity.
In My Lai the shooting that began immediately upon landing was described as
"starting a chain reaction" (Hersh 1970:51). The promiscuous shooting of civil
ians tended to increase as more individual soldiers cast aside their personal
reservations and joined in the slaughter.
Their justification, no doubt,
resided in the perception that "...everybody was doing it: therefore it must be
right."
During the height of the attack soldiers injudiciously threw hand
grenades into "hootches" or set fire to the structures and shot wom^ and
children as they fled. There were also instances where groups of villagers were
-rounded up, methodically executed, and their bodies thrown into a nearby ditch.
Others were herded into the ditches and shot where they cringed.
That some of
the soldiers "got carried away" was witnessed by one of the more active
participants. Corporal Paul Headlo, who was reported to have sobbed uncontrol
lably while methodically shooting villagers.
Although an accurate count of the

number slain was impossible to ascertain, most reliable estimates place the
number at 400-500, nearly all of them infants, children, women and older men.
The Sand Creek episode featured similar carnage as the Colorado Volunteers
attacked the peaceful Cheyenne encampment as their leader reminded them to
"...remember

the

murdered women and children on the Platte"

(Dunn

1961:147).

The soldiers opened fire with both carbines and artillery. They had been warned
to expect heavy resistance, but little was encountered.
Despite this, the
soldiers increased the intensity of the attack.
The chief. Black Kettle, and
some of his followers cloaked themselves in the American flag thinking this
would offer protection from the onslaught.
Unfortunately this attempt to sur
render proved futile as the soldiers fired at the huddled Indians.
The few
Cheyenne capable of offering resistance attempted to establish a defensive line

across the creek, but this was easily destroyed by artillery fire.
Soldiers
quickly surrounded a group of about 100 villagers and proceeded to shoot into
the group until none remained standing. The great majority of this group were
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defenseless women and children. With the village routed^ the rest of the massa
cre consisted of riding down people attempting to escape and killing them one or
two at a time.
Reliable estimates of the carnage range from 200-500 killed and
wounded.
Eye witness accounts report that over 2/3 of the victims were noncombatants.

The Hounded Knee massacre was precipitated in a maimer somewhat different
from the others.
The barrage of firing by members of the 7th Cavalry was
prompted by a single gunshot, which sparked a massive fusillade of return fire
from the soldiers* carbines and two Hotchkiss (artillery) guns.
The indis
criminate killing followed immediately (U.S. Bureau of American Ethnology
1892:055).
The camp members quickly fled to avoid the soldiers, but the sol
diers "...shot us like we were buffalo" (Brown 1970:417). Although a few of the
Sioux were armed, most victims were either unarmed non-combatants or carried
only knives or clubs. The token resistance was quickly overpowered,
and the
"hunt"

continued with scattered women and children killed over 2-3

miles

the battle site.
The final death toll is unknown because many of the
crawled away from the camp or were carried away before being included

army's count.

from

wounded
in the

The most reliable figures placed the final death toll at 2QO-2&0

persons, most of whom were women and childr^.'
Little is known of the precise details of the Elogeta River massacre.
Some
speculate that the leader, Getelu, may have planned the event. Others suggest
that some of his younger leaders might have handed it to him as a fait accornoli.

When the discovery was made that all the police except one were going to distant
Wamena for a few days, the attack was launched.
Hen crept at dawn through the
fog. The attack lasted only an hour or so, but the deaths of 125 men, women and
children

occurred.

Steel bush knives were used instead of the usual bows

and

arrows. The bodies were hastily cremated on mass pyres without ceremony.
The massacre in the Sabra and Shatilla camps is not as well documented because
there exists little first-hand testimony with respect to the behavior of the
Phalangists during their thirty-six hour stay. Although the Phalangist command
ers promised not to harm civilians and even went so far as to make their men

t^e an oath to that effect,

it was apparent that they exercised little (xxttrol

over their men (Kahan, 1983:48). No direct orders were given to slaughter camp
residents, but those who entered the camps "were steeped in hatred for the
Palestinians... longing for revenge" (Kahan, 1983:55).' Soldiers of the Israeli
Defense Forces heeurd of rumors that indicated that Phalangists were "running
wild" and had killed seme civilians.
When asked why they were killing civil
ians, Phalangists responded by stating that "...pregnant women will give birth
to terrorists and children will grow up to be terrorists" (Kahan, 1983:35).
Similarly, an Israeli officer overheard a radio transmission in which a Phalangist soldier in the camps asked his superior what was to be done with prison
ers. The reply instructed that he "...do the will of God." Another question was
answered by the following statement: "This is the last time you're going to ask
me a question like that, you know exactly what to do."
The reply was followed
by laughter (Kahan, 1983:22).
Phalangists initially denied responsibility for
the mass killings by claiming that the dead represented the inevitable civilian
casualties that always occur during armed combat. The post-massacre investiga
tion, however, provided irrefutable proof that Phalangist forces had waged an
indiscriminate slaughter of camp residents despite efforts to cover their ac
tions.
V.

nRSTRtlCTTTnH OF THE MASSACRE STTR

Participation in massacres is probably accon^wied by guilt feelings en the
part of the perpetrators. This undoubtedly stems from their monstrous behavior
10
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and the eventual realization of the enormity of the atrocities

conmitted.

The

initial killings of innocent persons give rise to doubts and feelings of guilt
that
in turn create more anxiety and hostility which are also displaced onto
the victims. A vicious cycle results, which culminates in an apparently reason
less and barbaric behavior toward a group that was guilty OTily of being objects
of the initial hostility (Dollard 1938:18).

In massacre this behavior manifests itself in the form of a complete destruc
tion of the site.
From a psychological perspective, it is possible the attack
ers wish to destroy all evidence and thereby expiate their collective guilt.
It may also serve as a cover-up in an effort to destroy all evidence that could
at some future date be used against them.
My Lai was completely razed by
American soldiers.
As well as burning all structures, livestock found in the
village was also destroyed.
The encampment at Sand Creek was similarly de
stroyed. > Sand Creek was also characterized by mutilation of corpses. Genitals
of both men and women were cut out as trophies by soldiers of the 3rd Colorado
Volunteers.
A possible motive for the nutilaticn of corpses lies in its sym
bolic degradation of the massacred group. This may also account for the looting
that occurred in all episodes.

The extent of the destruction seems to be related to three factors: 1) the
degree of rage; 2) the amount of time available; and 3) the technological means
to destroy.
If the behavioral loss of control is extmsive, time constraints
are not a factor, and technological means are at their disposal, then destruc
tion by the attacking group will be extensive.
kith flame throwers, explosives
and other devices at My Lai, the damage was cooplete. The short time period at
Hounded Knee and an impending snowstorm probably acted to limit the soldiers'
propensities for destruction and limited the damage. In the case of the Elogeta
River, bodies were quickly burned en masse on pyres, conpounds were completely
burned and village pigs were stolen.
The destruction and razing of the physical setting was severely limited in the

Beirut Massacre,

apparently because the limited time-frame u^er which the

massacring Fhalangists operated.
They were abruptly ordered out of the camps
on Saturday morning and had little time to. raze the site after the slaughter had
subsided.
In testimony given to the Kahan Commission, witnesses reported bull
dozers in the camps during the massacre.
The machinery was used to dig mass
graves or to push rubble over the corpses. There were also reports that Phalangist soldiers piled bodies of victims into trucks and took the remains with them

as

they departed.

These acts appear to have been motivated by the

desire

to

cover up the-magnitude of their carnage.

This stage of massacre appears to be the natural termination of an episode in
which uncontrolled behavior has already been extensively exhibited. The motiva
tion to obliterate the site may stem from the desire to warn survivors what
awaits them should they persist in their offending behavior.
In this context,
the devEistation of the site would perhaps function as a deterrent to possible
retaliatory behavior from survivors.
Another possible motive for destruction
may be the collective desire to purge one's conscience.
This would involve the
desire to eradicate all evidence and thereby serve as a symbolic form of denial.
The elimination of evidence, including mass graves of the victims as at Hounded
Knee, could also be related to the desire to prevmt future punishment for the
massacre.

In some cases there appeared to be a reaction to the massacre.

This could be

termed the retribution and punishment stage.
If powerful elements of social
control exist in the massacring group upon which pressure can be brought to
bear, then it is conceivable that punishments could be meted out to those
responsible.
Courts of inquiry were formed in the aftermath of My Lai, Sand
Creek, Hounded Knee and Sabra-Shatilla. The findings of these boards were used
11
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to censure or condemn and* in rare instances, imprison persons found guilty of
reprehensible behavior during the episode of massacre.
The general tendency,

however",

is

punishments.

to disavow responsibility for the massacre and hand out only token
It

is

also common that authorities must be

forced

to

action.

Pressure groups and various forms of media may function in such a capacity.
SUHMARlf

From the preceding analysis, it is apparent that the validity of the model is
generally supported by the narrative evidence of actual massaores, although five
is recognized to be a small sample. That each episode of massacre was preceeded
by a history of conflict between the groups is almost self-evident; but it is
important to document the underlying causes of the massacre Itself. Many groups
exist in conflict situations without massacres occurring. A massacre will occur
only when the conflict is of a particularly virulent type.
Moreover, tte con
flict festers over generations until a peaceful reconoilliation becomes an
impossibility.
With antagonism so ingrained in the two parties,' especially in
the massacring group, a collective preoccupation or obsession with destructicn

of the other group becomes pervasive among its members'.

Members of the stronger

group perceive the other group as a persistent threat to their own achievemmt
of goals or survival.
The call to rally or a period of intensification of emotion was also found to
occur immediately prior to the episode of massacre.
This appears to be a
necessary
stage
to "hype up" or "bring to boil" hostility, that
has been
seething for a long time. • The call to rally vividly reinforces the fiendish
nature of the opponents and proposes a way of dealing with the enemy once - and
for all.
This stage is usually caused by a recent incident that confirms and
dramatizes the menacing nature of the enemy.
A surprise attack is the usual mode of launching a massacre.
The attack not
only establishes initial advantage, but also represents an unfair "way of
fighting". Striking without warning, however, is justified by the intense hos
tility toward the other group. A sneak attack "is what they deserve.
That indiscriminate slaughter is found in massacre may seem tautological. By
this definition, the authors included only episodes where this was found. - Hhat
was hoped to be stressed by discussing this stage were the elements of loss of
control and pattern of needless killing. Massacres develop when average people
lose
Control.
Hobs that commit massacres are not composed exclusively of
pathological individuals, though demagogues are sometimes found in leadership
positions. Instead, groups represent cross-sections of a society that, because

of

emotional exigencies,

get carri^ away.

Massacres illustrate the key

de

scriptive elements of collective behavior-aroused emoticn and loss of critical
abilities. The behavior in massacres seems to feed upon and reinfoi^e itself.
Questionable behavior, including murdering women and children, when repeated by
others tends to become legitimized. This pattern has been termed circular reac
tion (Blumer 1975:26>.
A similar process occurs when one person's behavior
becomes a model for others in the situation:

When a person sees that his or her behavior is being

by others,

imitated

he or she is stimulated to ev^ higher levels of

activity and excitement.
The imitators'correspondingly in
crease their own levels of activity and simultaneously serve
as behavioral
1978:31).

models for still more people (Perry

Pugh
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Site destruction seems to provide a closure to the ^isode. this may be quite
variable in form but seems to be characterized by Intensity ami urgency. It

^pears to function as a release of stress,

expiation of guilt,

or,

in some

instances, the beginning of a coverup.

Host massacres are initially seen as a great victory. After Wounded Knee no
less than 18 soldiers were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for their

actions (Hatt^ 1960:9), Charlie Company was commended for its acticxis at Hy
Lai, and Chivington s men were hailed as heroes. As time passes, however, and

the enormity of the tragedy comes to light, the distressing nature of the ev«it
becomes clear. The word massacre is attached or is used to replace the word
battle when the episode is discussed. In the case of the three massacres
involv^ Americans, revisionist histories were written and these responsible

were vilified.

Such is not always the case in other cultures.

As a final note, histories of massacre are .largely written from the perspec
tive of the "victors"; the personal tragedies of the victims are forever lost,

as their humanity was stripped from them in death. Their stories or perceptims

^Id likely be very different from those of the perpetrators, and certainly
different from those of scientists, who construct models. To know how, and
perils, why massacres occur can probably not prevent them from happening; but

insights into the processes of dehumanization and slaughter can be observed and

recorded.

13

Published by Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and
13Inform

Great Plains Sociologist, Vol. 2 [1989], Art. 2
REFEBENCES

Abrahamson, Hark
1976
Fnnfft-.Tfmnl-iRm. Englenood Cliffs:

Prentice-Hall.

Briton, Crane
1985
Thft Anntnmv nf Rgvniiition. Hew York:

Vintage Books.

Brovn, Dee
1870

Bury Hv Heart At Wounded Rnee. Hew York:

Bantam Books.

Blunter, Herttert
1975
Outline of Collective Behavior, in R.R. Evans, ed.,
Colleotive Behavior. Chicago: Rand HcHally.
Dollard, John
1938
Hostility and Fear in Social Life,
Dunn, J.P.
1981

Hasgaopft of the Hoimtains.

ReariintfB in

Sooial Foreea. 17:18.

Hew York:

Archer House.

Edwards, Lyford
1970
The Natural History nf Rflvnlnt.irm. Hew York: Vintage Books.

Gamson, H.A,
1975
The Strategy of SrtciaT Proteat.
Hammer, Richard
1971
The Hniirt Martial nf T.t. Callev.
Geoghegan, Inc.

Illinois:

New York:

Dorsey Press.

Coward, HcCann and

Heider, Karl
1970
The niitftim Dani! A Papuan Cult-iire
Giiinea.

Hew York:

the HitfhIanHg of West Hew
H^mer Gren Foundation.

Hersh, Seymour H.
1970
Hv Lai 4. Hew York: Random House.
Hopper, Rex D.

1950

A Revolutionary Process:
Revolutionary Movements.

A Frame of Reference for the Study of
Amarioan SooiQlotfioal Review 28:271-279.

Kahan Commission

1983

Tha BRinit Hagaaore.

Hew York:

Kurz-Cohl.

Lofland, John

1981

"Collective Behavior - The Elementary Forms." in Social.PsychQlggy:
Scffliological Perspectives. Hew York. Hew York: Basic Books.

Mattes, Merril

1980

The Enigma of Hounded Knee. Plains Anthropolotfist 5(9):1-11.

Hauss, Arnold
1975
Snoial ProhlfimH aa Bnnial HnvamantR. HeW York: LippenCOtt.
14

https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/greatplainssociologist/vol2/iss1/2

14

Stewart and Zimmerman: To Dehumanize and Slaughter: A Natural History Model of Massacres
HcKinneyj John C.

1986

Construotlve Tvpolotfv and Rnoial Theory. Hew York: Appelton,
Century, Crofts.

Perry, Joseph and H.D. Pugh
1978
Collective Behavior;
Publishing Coiopany.

Response to Sooial StreBH.

St. Paul: Hest

Rose, Thomas

1970

How Violence Occurs:

A Theory and Review of the Literature, in

Violence in America. New York: Random House.

Smelser, Neil J.
1963
Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: The Free Press.
Stewart, James

1972

Urban Insurections: A Multi-disciplinary Approach Toward an Inte
Ph.D. Dissertation. Department of Rural
Sociology, South Dsdcota State University - Brookings, South Dakota.

grated Typology.

U.S. Bureau of American Ethnology
1892
Annual Report 14(2):885.

15

Published by Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and 15
Informa

